

## Message Text

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 INRE-00

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O 041027Z JUL 75  
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1895

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 MOSCOW 9327

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM, US, UR  
SUBJECT: TTBT/PNE NEGOTIATIONS: FIFTH WEEK SUMMARY, ROUND III  
TTBT/PNE DELEGATION MESSAGE NUMBER FORTY-SIX

1. SUMMARY. MEMBERS OF US DELEGATION MET WITH SOVIET SIDE IN TWO PLENARY, ONE SMALL LUNCHEON, AND TWO TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP MEETINGS. CONTINUED TO EXPLORE THE VARIOUS TOPICS UNDER DISCUSSION SINCE BEGINNING OF THIRD ROUND, WITH BOTH SIDES AGAIN SUMMARIZING THEIR POSITIONS AND THEIR UNDERSTANDING OF OTHER SIDES'S VIEWS. SOVIET SIDE MORE THAN ONCE PROPOSED TO COMMENCE WORK ON DRAFT AGREEMENT WITH US SIDE HOLDING OUT FOR SETTLEMENT OF SPECIFIC TOPICS FIRST. US SIDE CONTINUED TO QUESTION SOVIET SIDE ON SUBJECT OF LTBT COMPLIANCE WHEN CONDUCTING EXCAVATION EXPLOSIONS.

REPORTING:

2. SOVIET SIDE HAS AGREED THAT, BECAUSE ALL PRACTICAL MEASUREMENTS ARE APPROXIMATE, THERE IS NEED FOR A LIMIT ON MAXIMUM AGGREGATE YIELD OF CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS WHEN VERIFICATION IS BASED ON SLIFERS. THEY STATED THAT LIMIT SHOULD BE "SEVERAL TIMES" THE 500 KILOTONS PROPOSED BY THE US SIDE. SOVIET SIDE STATED THAT THERE IS NO OBJECTIVE NEED FOR A LIMIT ON MAXIMUM AGGREGATE YIELD OF CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS WHEN VERIFICATION IS BASED ON ON-SITE DEPLOYMENT OF N PLUS 3 GROUND MOTION GAUGES, WHERE N IS NUMBER OF

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EXPLOSIONS IN THE GROUP. HOWEVER, THEY ALSO STATED THAT,

TO MEET VIEWS OF US SIDE, A LIMIT OF THREE MEGATONS COULD BE SET ON MAXIMUM AGGREGATE YIELD OF CONTAINED GROUPS FOR WHICH VERIFICATION IS BASED ON SUCH A GROUND MOTION MEASUREMENT SCHEME. REFERENCE MOSCOW 9220, PARA 3.

3. SOVIET SIDE HAS AGREED THAT THERE SHOULD BE AGREEMENT ON SPECIFIC CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH A SET OF INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AS CONSTITUTING A CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSION AND IS, ACCORDINGLY, TO BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS GOVERNING CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS. THEY HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT THESE CONDITIONS SHOULD REFLECT THE CRITERION THAT INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS SHALL BE CONSIDERED AS SUCH, AND SHALL BE GOVERNED ONLY BY THE LIMITATIONS AND VERIFICATION PROVISIONS AGREED UPON FOR INDIVIDUAL CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS, IF THEY CAN BE INDIVIDUALLY RESOLVED BY TELESEISMIC MEANS. SOVIET SIDE HAS PROPOSED THAT THE CONDITIONS SEPARATING INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS FROM CONTAINED GROUP EXPLOSIONS SHOULD BE:

(A) SPACINGS IN DISTANCE BETWEEN EXPLOSIONS OF 10 KILOMETERS OR MORE, OR (B) SPACINGS IN TIME BETWEEN SEQUENTIAL EXPLOSIONS OF 2 SECONDS OR MORE. CORRESPONDING FIGURES PROPOSED BY US SIDE ARE 40 KILOMETERS AND 5 SECONDS. THE US FIGURES ARE BASED ON NEED TO RESOLVE INDIVIDUAL EXPLOSIONS THROUGH TELESEISMIC MEANS AND, IN ADDITION, MEASURE THESE INDIVIDUAL YIELDS WITH PRECISION NEAR THAT FOR A LONE EXPLOSION (SEE ROUND III INTER-AGENCY PAPER, PAGES 27-29). SOVIET STATEMENT ONLY MENTIONED ABILITY TO RESOLVE. THIS POSSIBLE DISTINCTION HAS NOT YET BEEN EXPLORED WITH SOVIETS. REFERENCE MOSCOW 9220, PARA 4; MOSCOW 9073, PARA 1.

4. MOROKHOV STATED IN PRIVATE MEETING THAT WITH RESPECT TO COMPLIANCE WITH LTBT:

(A) SOVIETS WOULD, IN PNE AGREEMENT, REAFFIRM INTENTION TO STRICTLY COMPLY WITH LTBT.

(B) SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE BEING PATIENT ABOUT US NOTES ON WEAPON TESTS, BUT KEEP BOTHERING HIM AND STATE COMMITTEE TO REPLY TO KIND.

(C) EVERYONE KNOWS THAT ANY NUCLEAR EXPLOSION, EVEN A FULLY CONTAINED ONE, WILL PUT SOME RADIOACTIVITY OUTSIDE NATIONAL SECRET

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BORDERS.

(D) TO SOVIETS, COMPLIANCE WITH LTBT MEANS THAT NO NUCLEAR EXPLOSION SHOULD INCREASE THE GENERAL (WORLDWIDE?) RADIOACTIVE BACKGROUND.

(E) US NOTES ABOUT RADIOACTIVITY FROM SOVIET WEAPON TESTS ALWAYS SEEM TO BE TIMED TO COINCIDE WITH SOME RELATED DEVELOPMENT OF US-SOVIET RELATIONS, LIKE THE PRESENT NEGOTIATIONS, AND THEREFORE ARE DESIGNED TO SERVE SOME POLITICAL

PURPOSE OTHER THAN CONSISTENCY OF SOVIET WEAPON TESTS WITH LTBT.  
(F) SOVIETS HAVE TECHNOLOGICAL DESIGNS WHICH WILL ALLOW THEM TO CONDUCT EXCAVATION PNES SO THAT NOT ANY REPEAT NOT ANY RADIOACTIVITY WILL BE PLACED OUTSIDE NATIONAL BORDERS, EXCEPT FOR POSSIBLE OCCASIONAL ACCIDENTS. THE MEANS FOR DOING THIS WAS STATED TO BE A COMBINATION OF: PROJECT DESIGN, DESIGN OF THE EXPLOSIVE DEVICE, AND SPECIAL EMPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES. REFERENCE MOSCOW 9160, PARAS 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20.

5. SOVIET SIDE, SEVERAL TIMES, ADVOCATED A START ON DRAFTING AGREEMENT LANGUAGE. MOROKHOV EXPRESSED SPECIFIC HOPE THAT THIS COULD START "WITHIN 10 DAYS AT THE OUTSIDE." REFERENCE MOSCOW 9160, PARAS 6, 23; MOSCOW 9076, PARA 4; MOSCOW 8996, PARA 11.

6. SOVIET SIDE AGAIN RAISED THE PROBLEM FOR NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY OF CITING THE FISSION-YIELD LIMITATION IN PNE AGREEMENT. THEY SAID THAT THIS ITEM WOULD NEED TO BE FORMULATED WITH EXTREME CARE IN AGREEMENT LANGUAGE, BUT ON QUESTIONING MOROKHOV AND TIMERBAEV INDICATED THAT THEY HAD NO IDEAS ON HOW TO SET FORTH THIS LIMITATION WITHOUT CREATING THE PROBLEMS ENVISIONED. REFERENCE MOSCOW 9160, PARA 7; MOSCOW 8271, PARA 16.

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7. MOROKHOV SAID IN PRIVATE MEETING THAT WITH RESPECT TO FISSION YIELD VERIFICATION AND MELT SAMPLES:

(A) SOVIET SPECIAL EMPLACEMENT TECHNIQUES WOULD NOT AFFECT FISSION YIELD VERIFICATION THROUGH MELT SAMPLE ANALYSES. SEE PARA 3((F));

(B) SOVIET AUTHORITIES ARE OPPOSED TO ALLOWING OBSERVERS TO TAKE MELT SAMPLES HOME FOR ANALYSIS, BUT HE DOES NOT KNOW WHY; IF IT WERE UP TO HIM HE WOULD NOT CARE.

REFERENCE MOSCOW 9160, PARA 18.

8. THE EXPANDED LIST OF INFORMATION EXCHANGE ITEMS, WHICH CONTAINS ELEMENTS NOT RELATED TO TELESEISMIC YIELD VERIFICATION AND NOT LISTED IN AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT PROTOCOL ONE SUBMITTED BY US DELEGATION ON 25 JUNE (MOSCOW 8788), WAS REVIEWED BY NEW WORKING GROUP VI, COMPRISED OF MEMBERS FROM ALL FOUR ORIGINAL WORKING GROUPS. DETAILED DISCUSSIONS OF WHY THE ADDITIONAL ELEMENTS OF INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED, TO WHAT USE THEY WILL BE PUT, AND THE ACCURACY PRECISION REQUIRED TOOK PLACE IN TWO MEETINGS THIS WEEK. (SEPTEL). AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED ON A FEW ITEMS AND IS BEING REACHED ON OTHERS. ADDITIONAL DISCUSSION WILL TAKE PLACE 8 JULY. OF PARTICULAR INTEREST ARE TWO THINGS: (1) THE ORIGINAL LIST OF ITEMS RELATED TO YIELD VERIFICATION USING TELESEISMIC TECHNIQUES IS NOT AN ISSUE IN THESE DISCUSSIONS-- THERE IS AGREEMENT, AND (2) THE SOVIET SIDE WILL ONLY DISCUSS THOSE ITEMS WHICH INVOLVE OBSERVER RIGHTS AND

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FUNCTIONS AT A LATER TIME WHEN THAT SPECIFIC SUBJECT IS BEING EXPLORED.

9. DELEGATION SOUGHT, AND RECEIVED, CONFIRMATION FROM SOVIET SIDE THAT EXPLOSIONS PLANNED AS RETARCS WOULD BE CONSIDERED CONTAINED EXPLOSIONS. REFERENCE MOSCOW 9220 PARAGRAPH 10; STATE 155884 PARAGRAPH 4; STATE 152574 PARAGRAPH 5; MOSCOW 9076 PARAGRAPH 6; MOSCOW 8997 PARA 1.

10. DELEGATION COMMENTS

10. DELEGATION WILL TAKE UP DIFFERENCES IN U.S. AND SOVIET NUMBERS DEFINING BOUNDARY BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP EXPLOSIONS (SEE PARAGRAPH 2) AFTER HEARING FROM SAFRONOV ON JULY 8. REFERENCE MOSCOW 9220 PARAGRAPH 5.

11. DELEGATION WILL NOT ENCOURAGE ESTABLISHMENT OF TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP ON FACTORS INVOLVED IN SETTING LIMIT ON MAXIMUM AGGREGATE YIELD OF CONTAINED GROUPS, AT LEAST UNTIL WE HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF SOVIET VIEWS ON THIS ISSUE (SEE PARAGRAPH 1, ABOVE).

12. FOLLOWING FAIRLY DETAILED COMMENTS ON LTBT COMPLIANCE BY MOROKHOV AT PRIVATE LUNCHEON MEETING JULY 1 (SEE PARA 4 ABOVE) DELEGATION INTENDS TO RAISE MATTER NEXT IN A

RESTRICTED, BUT SCHEDULED, MEETING BECAUSE SUCH A MEETING  
WOULD BE LIKELY TO ALSO INCLUDE SAFRONOV (MOD) AND  
WOULD INCLUDE OPEN ARRANGEMENTS FOR SYSTEMATIC NOTETAKING.  
REFERENCE STATE 152574 PARAGRAPH 3; STATE 138355 PARAGRAPH 2.

13. VISAS FOR ALL EXCEPT FOSTER EXPIRE JULY 12.  
IS WAS  
MENTIONED BY MARTIN TO TIMERBAEV DURING TELEPHONE CONVER-  
SATION JULY 3. TIMERBAEV SUGGESTED ASKING KORNIYEV TO MAKE  
ARRANGEMENTS. THIS WILL BE DONE ON JULY 8.  
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## Message Attributes

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**TAGS:** PARM, US, UR  
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